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THE CULTURE OF HONOR: HOW SLAVEHOLDERS
RESPONDED TO THE ABOLITIONIST MAIL CRISIS
OF 1835
JENNIFER ROSE MERCIECA
In the summer of 1835 northern abolitionists mailed over 100,000 anti-slavery
newspapers to slaveholders in the South, which led slaveholders to violently pre-
vent the abolitionist sentiment from circulating in their local communities. In
analyzing the discourse produced by the crisis, I argue that the slaveholders’
expert use of the norms of community obligation, which were supported by the
rhetoric of honor, allowed them both to reassert control over the national aboli-
tion debate and to retain their local status and privilege.
The post office department was created to serve the people of each and all of
the United States, and not to be used as the instrument of their destruction.
None of the papers detained have been forwarded to me, and I cannot judge
for myself of their character and tendency; but you inform me, that they are,
in character, “the most inflammatory and incendiary—and insurrectionary in
the highest degree.” By no act, or direction of mine, official or private, could I
be induced to aid, knowingly, in giving circulation to papers of this descrip-
tion, directly or indirectly. We owe an obligation to the laws, but a higher one
to the communities in which we live, and if the former be perverted to destroy
the latter, it is patriotism to disregard them.1
Postmaster General Amos Kendall was sufficiently outraged by “inflam-matory and incendiary” newspapers that he could recommend to his
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subordinate—Charleston, South Carolina’s Postmaster Alfred Huger—that
he suppress these papers as an act of local “patriotism.” Kendall’s letter of
August 4, 1835, was written in response to supplications from Huger for
advice about “incendiary missiles”—abolitionist newspapers—mailed by
“miserable fanatics” to “inflame the whole country.”2 And inflame the whole
country The Emancipator, The Slave’s Friend, Human Rights, and the Anti-
Slavery Record did. Within a matter of days angry citizens seized and
destroyed the mail in Charleston, South Carolina, while postmasters and
ship captains censored further mail from “bombing” the South. Within
weeks the still enraged citizens of Georgia, Mississippi, Virginia, and South
Carolina had passed laws and resolutions outlawing the newspapers and had
formed themselves into Committees of Safety, ostensibly to enforce the
peace. Enforcing the peace meant closing black schools, burning northern
abolitionists in effigy, and imprisoning and often lynching anyone suspected
of accepting the newspapers, and thus, harboring the outlawed “fanatical”
and “insurrectionary” opinions. Not all of their strategies, though, involved
such sensational and violent public displays; slaveholders also employed
more subtle means of establishing their authority over the abolition debate.
As William W. Freehling notes in his seminal The Road to Disunion, “neigh-
bors’ ostracism would deter those wishing incendiary mail.”3 Ostracism was
a viable strategy for reasserting control precisely because, as Kendall’s letter
attests, southerners believed that they owed a “higher obligation,”—or their
loyalty—to their local communities and thus would not hazard shameful
disapproval. In short, the pressure of local obligation could be relied upon to
define, enforce, and punish unacceptable opinions and behavior.
The controversy over the abolitionists’ mail simultaneously raised ques-
tions about the freedom of the press, the purpose of the post office, and the
ability of southerners to control their public sphere. In other words, commu-
nication and communication technologies were at the center of the debate
over abolition in 1835. Yet, despite the apparent significance of the abolition-
ist mail crisis to scholars of rhetoric and public affairs, the story has been
obscured behind the larger stories of the decade: the Nullification Crisis, the
Nat Turner Slave Rebellion, and the Gag Rule Controversy. This is a regrettable
lacuna because a sustained analysis of the crisis will not only add to our under-
standing of the rhetorical moves made by antebellum slaveholders in their
quest to maintain power and slavery, but will also add to our understanding of
the ways in which the mandates of obligation and honor worked together to
define the limits of acceptable southern behavior and southern rhetoric.
Specifically, I argue that slaveholders successfully relied upon the rhetorical
techniques inherent in the “culture of honor”—unification, vigilance, and
threats—to control the public discourse about abolition in 1835.
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To understand this complex discourse I first review the relevant rhetorical
and historical scholarship on antebellum slaveholder rhetoric. Next, I retell the
story of the crisis, paying particular attention to how slaveholders used the
norms of community obligation to control the southern public sphere. Finally,
I delineate the main features of the “rhetoric of honor.” Specifically, I describe
how the mandates of community obligation and the fear of community shame
led to discourse designed to defend community norms, silence enemies, and
restore reputations. I conclude that the rhetoric of honor is not limited to
slaveholders’ defenses of slavery, but reflects tensions inherent in American
political rhetoric.
SCHOLARSHIP ON ANTEBELLUM RHETORIC AND ABOLITION
There has been a surprising paucity of interest in rhetorical scholarship about
why and how slaveholders justified their belief that slavery was just, expedient,
or necessary. Yet, it is important to understand this discourse because slave-
holders exercised extensive power in antebellum America.4 It is easy for us
today to sympathize with the abolitionist perspective, but it takes a concerted
effort to look at the world through the perspective of the slaveholder—no one
wants to be accused of making a hero out of antebellum slaveholders. It is not
surprising, therefore, that in the field of rhetorical studies one would have to
go back to 1987 and the work of Donald K. Enholm, David Curtis Skaggs, and
W. Jeffrey Welsh to find an essay that probes the difficult terrain of the devel-
opment of the “southern mind.” Yet, even that essay only concerns itself with
the southern mind prior to 1770. Even the best recent attempts by rhetorical
scholars to understand the peculiar ways of southerners does not approach the
question of slavery from the slaveholders’ perspective.5 V. William Balthrop
examined the relationships of culture, myth, and ideology in the creation,
defense, and demise of southern culture, but seemingly did not consider slave-
holder rhetoric as a fundamental piece of that culture. The unfashionable
topic of the defense of slavery has thus suffered from a lack of recent attention.
The examination of the mail crisis grants scholars of rhetoric and public
affairs a unique opportunity to view how southerners developed and deployed
a new rhetoric on slavery at a moment of crisis.
Historians have long understood the abolitionist mail crisis of 1835 as an
intermediate step in the growing hostilities between slaveholders and aboli-
tionists in antebellum America. They place it into the context of several key
events from 1819 to 1835: the debate over the Missouri Question in 1819–20;
Denmark Vesey’s potentially deadly insurrection in South Carolina in 1822;
New York’s final elimination of slavery in 1827; David Walker’s publishing of
the Appeal in 1829; William Lloyd Garrison’s publishing of the Liberator in
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1831; Nat Turner leading 60 fellow sufferers on a 48-hour rampage in
Southampton County, Virginia, and the Virginia legislature publicly debating
abolition, but deciding that the time was not yet ripe to take action in 1832;
the American Anti-Slavery Society (AASS) vowing to fight for immediate abo-
lition, agitating for the abolition of the slave trade in Washington, D.C., and
publishing its four newspapers devoted to immediatism in 1833; and, in the
summer of 1835, Mississippi’s Madison and Hinds counties erupting in a
panic over rumors of a white-led slave revolt, which was followed closely by
abolitionist newspapers appearing in southern mail bags.
While it is clear that sectional hostilities were beginning to grow in the
1830s, it is important to note that the question of abolition was not an easy
binary between southerners and northerners. Yet, as the above chronicle
attests, it is also clear that by 1835 there were those who were willing to agitate
for abolition and those who were willing to use violence to defend slavery.
Therefore, we would do well to think of the abolitionist mail crisis of 1835 as
a part of—indeed, it could be considered an escalation of—the rhetorical war
between slaveholders and abolitionists in Antebellum America. As William
Freehling noted, slaveholders in the 1830s lived amongst their “family friends”
with an increasing fear of insurrection. This fear prompted many slaveholders
to view abolitionists’ newspapers’ intrusion into their public sphere as an overt
act of aggression.6 Indeed, while still at the margins of power and popular
public opinion in 1835, abolitionism was becoming more vocal and more stri-
dent in its demands, which led to the innovation of new, more confronta-
tional, tactics like the “mail bombing” of the South.
I build from the work of several historians who have studied the contro-
versy: Bertram Wyatt-Brown argued that by 1835 abolitionism had “reached a
crisis” and thus, that it was “essential for the Anti-Slavery Society to reorganize
its publications, to raise more funds, and to resolve internal bickerings in com-
mon effort.” By 1835, writes Wyatt-Brown, “the time had come to make the
country aware of abolitionism.”7 To achieve this goal the AASS “decided to
flood the country with antislavery literature” by drawing up a mailing list of
“over twenty thousand Southerners” and sending over “one hundred and sev-
enty-five thousand copies” of their four periodicals to the South through the
New York Post Office.8 Thus, the AASS consciously devised their new south-
ern strategy with the goal of drawing attention to the cause of abolition, but
not necessarily in the hope of persuading southern slaveholders of the evils of
slavery. This is noteworthy, because as will become apparent, slaveholders also
addressed their appeals to already sympathetic audiences in an attempt to
reestablish and defend consensus, not necessarily in the hope of altering the
opinions of the abolitionists, who they believed were beneath contempt and
not worthy of persuading. Thus, the abolitionist mail controversy of 1835 was
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characterized by rhetorical discourse that was devoted more to reaffirming
community norms than to persuading the opposition.
Further, the new AASS strategy, as Amos Kendall decried, “perverted” the
federal postal laws, which implicated the federal government in the abolition-
ist agenda. Indeed, W. Sherman Savage argued that the intrusion of abolition-
ist newspapers into the South aroused “unusual fear” precisely because “it made
the national government an agent of the abolitionists who were doing so much
to the detriment of the slaveholding section.”9 Yet, in Clement Eaton’s account
of the crisis the AASS was a mere “minority group disliked both in the North
and the South.” And, while slaveholders were also a “minority group,” Eaton
argued that the federal government allowed the “virtual censorship of the
mails,” which indicated “the ascendancy of the Southern group in federal poli-
tics during the ante-bellum period.” In other words, Eaton believes that the sig-
nificance of the abolitionist mail crisis was to demonstrate that slaveholders
had little to fear from abolitionists in 1835. 10 This last view cannot withstand
scrutiny, for while the result of the crisis was to reassert slaveholder control,
slaveholders in 1835 believed that they had much to fear from the abolitionist
propaganda.
Susan Wyly-Jones argued that the intrusion of abolitionists’ newspapers
in the carefully censored southern public sphere “re-ignited the slavery con-
troversy in the South.” She analyzed the anti-abolition sentiment in the
months after the first AASS newspapers appeared in the South and discov-
ered that in the three months after the initial “mail bombing” southerners
held more than 150 anti-abolition meetings—in every slaveholding state
save Kentucky and Delaware—where resolutions were passed condemning
the mail.11 Additionally, by combing newspapers and census records she was
able to identify many of the anti-abolition meeting leaders and attendees.
She found that, as we might expect, the meetings were run by local elites, but
that they were attended by all classes of white men. Wyly-Jones concluded
that the meetings “functioned as ritualistic displays of white unity and the
communal means of enforcing race control”; as such, the meetings “provide
a revealing illustration of ways in which Southerners strove to unite the
region socially and politically behind its domestic institution.”12 Therefore,
the outpouring of southern sentiment in the wake of the abolitionist mail cri-
sis can be considered the rhetorical means of defining and enforcing local com-
munity unity. Once again, the work of historians would suggest that the
rhetorical appeals in the aftermath of the mail bombing were directed inward
to sympathetic audiences, rather than outward to the larger American
community.
Southern unity was necessary because the abolitionists’ mail exacerbated
preexisting and pervasive fears of slave insurrection. The wake of Nat Turner’s
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1831 revolt and the more recent Mississippi insurrection scare had left south-
erners in fear of bloody slave revolts. In addition, the accounts of historians
make it clear that slaveholders faced a newly determined antagonist in 1835
and that with their use of the post office strategy abolitionists could seemingly
attack from a distance, out of the range of southern laws and community
ostracism. Freehling is quick to point out that the relationship between south-
ern “despotism and democracy” was an uneasy one in 1835: in order to keep
slavery legal the slavocracy had to pretend that all white men were equal. The
extension of the right of suffrage to all white men in the 1820s had given poor
and middling whites the power to end slavery, and “nonslaveholding migrants
were filling up western Maryland, western North Carolina, western Virginia,
and even bits of western South Carolina . . . These Westerners inside the Old
East, like immigrants to the New West, wanted egalitarian republicanism for
whites.”13 Indeed, by the 1850 census only about 34 percent of southerners
could claim to own any slaves at all.14 By 1860 only 1.4 percent of Americans
in all states and territories held slaves (393,975 out of 27,303,009).15 Non-
slaveholders forced state constitutions to be re-written in states like Virginia,
where less enslaved western Virginia demanded that the Tidewater elite give up
some of their power in state politics. In short, the slaveholding elite were los-
ing power to non-slaveholders who were ambivalent about the benefits of
maintaining slavery.
Yet, as Thomas Roderick Dew’s 1832 Abolition of Negro Slavery makes clear,
no one had a feasible plan for eliminating slavery.16 Southerners agreed that if
slavery were to end, then slave owners would have to be compensated, but
many believed that there was never going to be enough money for adequate
compensation. Further, southerners feared the idea of emancipated blacks
remaining in the South, but they believed that removal of the free black pop-
ulation was just as impossible as compensation. Therefore, since there was no
viable method by which to achieve emancipation, slaveholders reasoned that
it was just best to leave the subject alone. Northern abolitionists believed that
these “constraints” on abolition were mere excuses and that slavery was
morally wrong and thus demanded immediate emancipation.
In addition to the dangers to southern economic livelihood and personal
safety, the conflicting societal demands of despotism and democracy were
replicated in slaveholders’ daily lives. Freehling describes the life of the slave-
holder as a kind of “schizophrenia”: “egalitarian republics required leaders to
play unassuming convincer. Enslaved plantations required elites to exert
overbearing coercion. The egalitarian and the elitist inside the same skin
often popped out in the wrong realm. Elitists who trespassed onto egalitari-
ans’ turf were especially resented among white folk inside black-belt neigh-
borhoods.”17 In response to the tensions inherent in the conflict between
56 RHETORIC & PUBLIC AFFAIRS
despotism and democracy, slaveholders sought control. Indeed, “southern
masters’ self-esteem, their self-respect, their very survival swung on the legit-
imacy of title. . . . To master oneself, to master others, to be master of all one
surveys is so unlikely as to make the very concept suspect.”18 Slaveholders were
at once convincer and coercer; democrat and despot; and they felt pressure
from all sides: poor whites, enslaved blacks, free blacks, newly enfranchised
non-slaveholders, and now northern abolitionists all required mastering, all
required that slaveholders negotiate the schizophrenic demands of control.
The abolitionists’ newspapers therefore threatened elite slaveholders’ ability to
control their public sphere, to control the question of abolition, to control
their slaves, to control free blacks, and to control poor whites.
In the fragile world of the despot’s democracy the one thing that slave-
holders could not tolerate was a loss of control, thus raising the question: How
did slaveholders reassert and maintain control when confronted with the cri-
sis of the abolitionists’ mail appearing in the southern public sphere? In
response to the impossibility of being able to master everyone, all of the time,
the slaveholding elite responded to the new threat of abolitionism with coer-
cive violence, rather than with democratic persuasion. Slaveholders’ expert use
of the norms of community obligation, enforced and supported by the
rhetoric of honor, allowed them to reassert control over the abolition debate.
LOCALS PURIFY AND PREVENT INCENDIARY MAIL:
THE STORY OF THE ABOLITIONIST MAIL CRISIS
The post office in Charleston, S.C was forcibly entered on the night previous, by
removing the inside shutter, and a bag, containing a large number of incendiary
tracts and newspapers intended for distribution to the south and west, taken
thence, of which it was understood that a bonfire was publicly to be made on the
following night, at eight o’clock, without the limits of the city. 19
The Niles Weekly Register reprinted the story of the mob of “two or three
hundred citizens” who confiscated and destroyed the mail in Charleston on
July 30, 1835.20 Also reprinted in the day’s news were reactions to the conta-
mination and subsequent cleansing from the Charleston Southern Patriot
and the Charleston Mercury and accounts from the Cincinnati Republican
and the Columbus Democratic Press about an attempted white-led slave
insurrection in Mississippi, which resulted in the lynching of “twenty-four
negroes and twelve white men.” Clearly with northerners mailing abolition-
ist propaganda and southern slaves and sympathetic whites colluding in a
“horrible conspiracy,” things were getting out of control in the South. The
simultaneous defense of the cleansing and derision of the mailing by the
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Charleston Southern Patriot offers a glimpse into how the slavocracy viewed
what was at stake in this controversy. First, the Patriot defended southern
mob action with states’ rights platitudes, “those states whose peculiar insti-
tutions are involved in hazard, must take the law into their own hands.
Extreme cases require extreme remedies.” Next, Charlestonians were reminded
that they indeed had a duty to protect their body politic from poisonous
outside contagions, “It never will do to allow our mails to be laden with these
anarchical publications, while our citizens fold their arms and permit the
poison to circulate through all the veins and arteries of society.” Finally, lest
Charlestonians get too used to taking the law into their own hands and begin
wantonly prescribing extreme remedies without the sanction of the slavoc-
racy, the Patriot recommended that such cleansing occur where it could be
viewed by all:
Let it be performed in open day light and on the highway, and that persons of
responsibility and weight of character be deputed to act in the name and for the
good of the whole of the citizens. Let us, if the necessity is imposed on us of tem-
porarily violating order, act with as little disorder as possible, and without the
agency of large masses of men, who may become excited beyond the necessities
of the case. 21
The Patriot sought to fight two battles simultaneously: first, Charleston’s
elite needed the mass of its citizens to hate, fear, and destroy the incendiary
mail, otherwise the abolitionists’ propaganda might have its desired effect and
the mostly middling and non-slaveholding South Carolinians might stop sym-
pathizing with wealthy plantation owners and might seriously question the
legitimacy of slavery. Thus, the Patriot labeled the abolitionists’ mail “poison”
that could not be allowed to “circulate” through the “veins and arteries of soci-
ety” while citizens folded their arms in acquiescence. Citizens were told to
think of their local community as an extension of their own bodies, and their
local community-body needed protection from “anarchical publications.”
Outside anarchists threatened local community safety and citizens were oblig-
ated to defend themselves and the good order of society.
The Patriot’s secondary concern was for their mostly middling and non-
slaveholding citizens to understand that it was the proper role of “persons of
responsibility and weight of character” to act for the interests of the whole,
thus reaffirming that while the community was under attack from “anar-
chists,” and while it was every citizen’s duty to take “extreme measures” against
the city’s enemies, most citizens were only to continue to follow the orders of
their betters and not allow themselves to become “excited” with lawlessness.
The Patriot described the difficulty in unleashing the mass from the power of
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the federal law: the slavocracy still had to retain its control over the mass of the
population, even as circumstance required encouraging that population to
break the law. As the Patriot seemed to be clearly aware, there was a great deal
of danger involved in the way that Amos Kendall had formulated community
obligation. While citizens were told to flaunt their disrespect of national law
because it had been perverted to attack their community, local law, also known
as elite rule, was still to be respected.
Southern leaders relied on the norms of community obligation to maintain
order and to control potential forces of anarchy in both the North and South.
Southern leaders alternately cajoled, threatened, and enlisted the aid of north-
ern abolitionists, postmasters and citizens, and of southern slaveholders and
non-slaveholders. Slaveholders initially insisted that abolitionists admit their
own guilt and stop the mailing. When this strategy failed, they demanded that
the North stand up and actively defend southern honor. When this last strat-
egy failed, slaveholders ordered violent retribution. It is by examining these
differing appeals that we gain a better understanding of how the norms of
community obligation could serve the needs of slave masters in their efforts to
reassert control and prevent anarchy.
APPEALS TO THE NORTH
The simplest way to end the problematic mail would have been for the aboli-
tionists to agree to stop the presses; however, as much as both southerners and
northerners condemned the actions of these “anarchists,” “fanatics,” and
“detestable villains” they would not agree to put an end to production. The New
York Herald reported that the Anti-Slavery Society responded to public pressure
to stop the mail with an unequivocal negative: “they passed a resolution declar-
ing, peremptorily that they would not abandon their right of transmitting,
through the post office all such tracts and papers as they choose to flood over
the country.” 22 In fact they did not stop printing and mailing their newspapers
and pamphlets throughout the nation. According to the Fourth Annual Report
of the American Anti-Slavery Society, from May 1836 to May 1837 (the year after
the first mailings began) 9,000 copies of The Anti-Slavery Magazine, 130,150
copies of The Slave’s Friend, 103,000 copies of The Anti-Slavery Record, 189,000
copies of Human Rights, and 217,000 copies of The Emancipator were pub-
lished and mailed throughout the country. 23
New printing technologies meant that abolitionists had a new and “unnat-
ural” tool for spreading their “detestable villainy.” For example, by December
22, 1835, Virginia Congressman John Jones would express his constituents’
fears of this new power in a floor speech abstracted in Gales and Seaton’s
Register of Debates in Congress:
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Was it not known to every gentleman upon this floor that numerous abolition
societies had been formed in the eastern and northern States, frowned upon,
indignantly frowned upon, he believed, by the intelligent, the well-informed,
and the respectable portions of these communities. But could they shut their
eyes to the fact, that these societies existed, that they had gone on to collect large
sums of money, and had put into operation printing presses, which were worked
by steam? Yes, sir, worked by steam, with the open and avowed object of effect-
ing the immediate abolition of slavery in the Southern states. That by means of
these two great revolutionizers of the world, he meant steam power, and the
press, they had caused to be printed, and by means of the public mails, circulated
throughout the slaveholding States, large numbers of newspapers, pamphlets,
tracts, and pictures, calculated, in an eminent degree, to rouse and inflame the
passions of the slaves against their masters, to urge them on to deeds of death,
and to involve them in all the horrors of a servile war. 24
As Jones’s speech attests, the southern slavocracy viewed the raising of
money, the printing of abolitionist papers, and the mailing of them into the
South as both an intentional and a coordinated act of aggression. And while
his fear of the use of new communication technologies may seem irrational,
it may also be viewed as a legitimate response to fears of modernity and the
attendant further ebbing of the slaveholders’ ability to control everything
and everyone around them. The kind of complete mastery necessary to
ensure the perpetuation of the southern way of life meant that their public
sphere had to be closely guarded against “outside” perspectives, lest slaves,
sympathetic whites, and free blacks begin to think like the outsiders from the
“Eastern and Northern states.” What could be worse than abolitionists,
whom the “respectable” part of society “frowned upon,” seizing control of
these new technologies and using them in ways that no one had ever con-
ceived of before while good men “shut their eyes?” What else could these
“miserable fanatics” do, if they could do this and the South was powerless to
stop them? These questions not only boggled the mind, but they also led
southerners to rigidly defend their public sphere from the perversion of
these unnatural technologies.
The next step in attempting to stop the mail was to prevent the newspapers
from being shipped from New York down South. To aid in this plan,
Charleston Postmaster Alfred Huger enlisted James Monroe’s son-in-law, New
York Postmaster Samuel L. Gouverneur. Gouverneur agreed that the mail was
dangerous and requested the American Anti-Slavery Society to stop sending it
to the South—to no avail. He therefore decided that he would “aid in preserv-
ing the public peace” by censoring the abolitionists’ mail himself. In making 
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this decision Gouverneur solicited the opinion of Amos Kendall, who wrote
that “the postmaster general has no legal authority, by any order or regulation
of his department, to exclude from the mails any species of newspapers, mag-
azines or pamphlets.” But, even though Kendall believed that he was powerless
to stop the mail by General order, he still had “no hesitation in saying, that I
am deterred from giving any order to exclude the whole series of abolition
publications from the southern mails only by want of legal power; and that if I
were situated as you are, I would do as you have done.”25 Undeterred, the Anti-
Slavery Society merely diverted their mailings from New York to Philadelphia
and other places and began to try to hide the contents in seemingly innocuous
packages. Hazard’s Register of Pennsylvania reports that on August 25, 1835,
newspapers of the “most incendiary and inflammatory character” were hidden
in a “large wooden box, apparently filled with dry goods.” Upon discovery, the
helpful dock workers destroyed the incendiary newspapers.26
Aside from obliging postmasters and dock workers, southerners also
received the support of anti-abolitionist citizens in Philadelphia, New York
City, Albany, and Connecticut, among others. For example, Bostonians assem-
bled in Faneuil Hall—the “Cradle of Liberty”—to “let a manifesto go forth
declaratory of our sentiments, as to the rights of the south, and of our abhor-
rence of the conduct of those combinations, which, under the name of phil-
anthropy, are encouraging the worst of all possible calamities which can befal
[sic] a nation, A CIVIL AND A SERVILE WAR.”27 Slaveholders greeted news
of northern sympathy with skepticism: they demanded action not words. For
example, one Georgian made the distinction between words and action
explicit, “These northern and eastern gentlemen are very shrewd and artful.
Their interest is their grand passion. . . . Is it not abundantly proved by all the
resolutions and reservations at Boston, New York and other places?” He had
no trouble answering his own question, “‘Words, words, words,’ are all we are
to have, and they will not at all restrain [Arthur] Tappan and his associates. We
are told the ABOLITIONISTS are few in numbers. It is not so. They constitute
a very large majority of all the people.” 28 Despite the fact that it was precisely
the force of words that the slaveholders feared most—the words written in the
abolitionists’ newspapers—our anonymous citizen of Augusta, Georgia,
berated northern anti-abolitionists for their lack of supportive violence.
Slaveholders feared the power of words; yet, words were not enough to
combat words. Slaveholders believed that the abolitionists’ words were vio-
lence; they therefore demanded that violence be met with violence. As the
fanatical abolitionists were thought to abound in the North another similarly
antagonistic slaveholder—this time from Virginia—dared the North to do
more to protect the South:
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Had a prophet spoken it, the last sentiment expressed by the Star could not be
more true: “The abolitionists must be put down or they destroy the union.” Choose
they! It is in their power to suppress them by legitimate and constitutional means.
Some of their presses consider this, menace, threat, hectoring, bravado! They little
know the state of southern feeling! They little know that the press in the south is
far below the tone of general excitement. They cannot know; it is impossible they
should know without residence, the cause there is for this excitement. 29
Building on the sentiment expressed by other slaveholders, this anonymous
Richmond Whig author demonstrated the categorical thinking in operation.
There were no gray areas: Americans were either with the South, slavery, and
safety or they were with the abolitionists, anarchy, and aggression. Thus, slave-
holders demanded that Americans choose. Such ways of thinking drove some
northerners to protest and petition the South in the hope that they would
understand that the North was on their side, while such thinking also drove
slaveholders to demand that northerners prove just how loyal to the South
they were. It seems as though nothing short of extraditing abolitionists for
southern lynching would have satisfied the “actions not words” mentality of
southerners in 1835. For how could mere words satisfy the “general excite-
ment” of “southern feeling?” In fact, how could any outsider from the North
even know the “tone” of feeling that this incendiary mail had caused? The
threat to southerners’ safety and property was palpable to those who lived
among the slaves and they knew that this threat must be controlled.
Slaveholders remained unconvinced that northerners understood the pre-
cise danger that the abolitionists had unleashed upon them. Thus, one strat-
egy for turning promises of northern support into action was to threaten a
“suspension of commercial intercourse with the northern states.”30 Some cities
like Lowell, Massachusetts were banished from trading with the South because
they openly supported the abolitionists. Other cities such as New York were
threatened with boycotts because southerners did not like the way that they
had framed their derision of the abolitionists. The New York Herald responded
to such threats with further protestations of sympathy and support for slave-
holders. “Where there is one abolitionist among the merchants north of the
Potomac,” wrote the Herald, “there are one hundred against the fanatics. A
general commercial non-intercourse would involve friends as well as foes.
Besides, this is a political not a commercial question—it is a question of state
rights, and should be so considered.” 31 The Herald correctly understood the
best way to show their support of the slavocracy—by adopting their talk of
“fanatics” and their categorical language of friends and foes—but, the Herald
mistook the question to be one merely of states’ rights. The question was per-
sonal as much as it was political and commercial; slaveholders understood that
62 RHETORIC & PUBLIC AFFAIRS
this was a question of state autonomy, of economic necessity, and most explic-
itly, a question of local safety and control. Northerners remained unpersuasive
in their attempts to mollify slaveholders. Southerners did not believe that out-
siders could comprehend the horrible threat to their safety caused by the abo-
litionists’ newspapers’ intrusion into their public sphere. Simply, the South did
not trust that the North would help to protect the South—such distrust frayed
the fragile threads of loyalty that constituted the imagined national commu-
nity and concomitantly caused southerners to focus their defensive energies
within their local communities.
APPEALS TO THE SOUTH
While slaveholders attempted to garner more action and less talk from the
North, it was less necessary to explain the dire consequences of freely circu-
lated abolitionist newspapers in the South. Southerners—slaveholders and
non—already understood the danger that these newspapers had introduced
into their lives. Yet, as the Charleston Southern Patriot had argued, southern
community obligation required that the mass of southerners continue to fol-
low the lead of their local “gentleman of character,” and not become “excited
with lawlessness.” Therefore, because the slavocracy needed to reassert its con-
trol over free and enslaved blacks and poor whites, appeals to fellow south-
erners asked them to unite against the incendiary mail, to maintain vigilance
in suppressing the mail, and to threaten outsiders with the full extent of south-
erners’ rage. These appeals can be understood as constituting the mandates of
community obligation where loyalty is paramount and ostracism is shameful.
The first slaveholder strategy for appealing to southerners was to present a
unified front for southern opposition. Yet, as Freehling notes, it was difficult to
claim unity when there was not “A South.” Differences between the barely
enslaved Border South states, the more enslaved Middle South states, and the
almost entirely enslaved Deep South states resulted in different crop produc-
tion, different power structures, different fears of slave insurrection, and
hence, different demands for control. The coordination of a united southern
response was crucial both for mitigating the threat of the abolitionists’ propa-
ganda and for demonstrating the South’s strength to its abolitionist foes.
Further, according to Freehling, people began to believe that “the idea of
abstract liberty, once agitated in the North and mailed to the South, would
turn some slaves’ heads, trouble some slaveholders’ consciences, [and] inspire
liberty-loving non-slaveholders North and South to turn against liberty’s
curse.”32 In response to the fear that the incendiary mail would lead some
southerners to question the legitimacy of slavery, slaveholders attempted to
join the disparate interests of the South in opposition.
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For example, Niles Weekly Register of August 8, 1835, contained an enlight-
ening history of the community ritual of vigilante justice known as “Lynch’s
Law,” followed by a reprint of a call for southern unification against the
“detestable villainy” of the abolitionist mailings. “Concurrent testimony,” the
National Intelligencer reported, “from different parts of the southern states,
satisfy us that the miserable fanatics, few in number, as they are, who manu-
facture the abolition journals, have flooded the mails with them, to the just
exasperation of the south, and to the great peril of the whole slave population
of their country.” 33 The Charleston Mercury of July 30, 1835, warned that the
incendiary newspapers were approaching and to whom they were addressed,
in order to “put our southern friends on their guard, and to warn them of the
insidious measures now in a course of execution for their destruction.” 34 Such
warnings were appreciated: Committees of Safety passed resolutions all over
the South, which formally required postmasters to warn citizens whenever
incendiary mail appeared in town. Local communities hoped that these warn-
ings would cut off the abolitionists’ access to the distributive power of the post
office, thereby allowing local communities to control their public sphere.
Importantly, the question debated at these meetings was not whether to abol-
ish slavery, but how best to silence those who would wish to advocate for the
abolition of slavery. In short, while there might not have been “A South” as
Freehling argued, southern leaders were united in their fear of the open dis-
cussion of abolition and this fear helped disparate southern communities to
join together against the force of dialogue.
The second slaveholder strategy for appealing to southerners was to use the
power of local law to force newly united citizens to be vigilant in their oppo-
sition to federal law. For example, the uproar over the newspapers in
Charleston caused the city to call a public meeting—less than a week after the
first mailings—“at which the subject of the interference of northern aboli-
tionists, in the rights of southern citizens, was warmly discussed.”35 The reso-
lutions passed in Charleston were the first of their kind, were widely reported
in the press, and were adopted by at least 150 other communities around the
South; therefore these resolutions merit consideration.
The city of Charleston adopted the following “by acclamation”: First, “That
we hold any attempt to impair the rights of property in our slaves, as guaran-
teed by the Constitution . . . as a wanton violation of our political compact,
and destructive of the whole frame of our government.” Second,“That we have
a just claim on all the non-slave holding States for the enactment of suitable
and efficient laws, to repress and put down by adequate penalties, all incendi-
ary or seditious associations, whose avowed purpose is to disturb our peace
and to excite insurrection among our slaves.” Third, Charlestonians asked for
“Captains of Steamboats” to “exercise the utmost vigilance in detecting any
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emissaries of the abolition societies” and for southerners to cease business
with those who did not comply. Finally, Charleston demanded that the “Post
Master General,” Amos Kendall, “use all the powers vested in him to prevent
the transmission and the delivery of all printed papers, suspected of a ten-
dency to produce or encourage an insubordinate or insurrectionary spirit
among the slaves of the South.” 36
The resolutions assumed that the twin powers of constitutional and local
community law should be used to threaten abolitionists and their sympathiz-
ers. The “insurrection” that Charleston’s citizens were fighting against was not
of local citizens disobeying federal law, but of outsiders disobeying local law.
Resolutions such as these were also passed in Georgia, North Carolina, and
Virginia, among other states. 37 Resolutions codified public opinion, gave
southern citizens clear local laws to follow, and warned outsiders that the
South would not allow the infiltration of its public sphere. The safety of the
local laws required that the South be united in condemning the mail and also
required that citizens be vigilant in protecting and defending their united per-
spective. Ultimately, however, slaveholders relied on threats of violence to
accomplish their goal of reasserting control.
The third slaveholder strategy for appealing to southerners was the use of
threats. Mostly these were threats of physical violence, but there were also
threats of ostracism, and negative consequences for the slaves whom the abo-
litionists were hoping to liberate. Further, slaveholders threatened northerners
that union and safety required that they control the abolitionists. Richmond,
Virginia’s Committee of Safety Resolutions, for example, admonished “our
northern fellow citizens, that as they value the blessings bestowed by our con-
stitution, and the continuance of the union; as they estimate the peace of our
country; as they would guard against evil commotion, war and bloodshed, to
make all within their boarders, and under the influence of their laws, desist
from their mad and wicked schemes.” 38 But, while northerners were threat-
ened with discord and disunion, those who harbored abolitionist sentiment in
the South would suffer more personally.
For example, on the night of July 30, 1835, when Charlestonians confis-
cated and destroyed the incendiary mail, they also warned of the consequences
of abolitionist sentiment by ordering that the “effigies of Arthur Tappan, Dr.
Cox, and W. L. Garrison, leading abolitionists,” be “publicly suspended.” The
Niles Weekly Register reported on August 22, 1835, that Charleston offered a
reward of $1,000 “for the apprehension and conviction of any person bringing
into this city, an incendiary paper or publication”; that “a man named Brady”
in North Carolina and “a man named Pugh” in Virginia were arrested and
charged “with ‘tampering’ with the slaves”; that a “suspicious” man in
Chestertown, Maryland was arrested after having been discovered to have
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been “in conversation with the negroes”; and finally, that “a man named
Robert Bell was hung in Clinton, Mississippi—as an ‘insurrectionist.’”39
Similarly, the Washington Globe reported that a “man named Crandell . . . was
taken up in Georgetown in this district, night before last, by the police officers
of this city, and put in jail, under the charge of circulating Tappan, Garrison &
Co.’s papers, encouraging the negroes to insurrection.”40 These accounts
demonstrate that southerners were serious about the threats caused by aboli-
tionists, and that they were just as serious about their threats to abolitionists
and their sympathizers. 41 The message was clear: anyone caught doing any-
thing suspicious would be surely and swiftly subject to punishment. By prov-
ing the power of local law to control the actions of its citizens, southerners also
proved that they could protect their interests without federal laws—that both
community interest and community justice were superior to federal law.
Despite the fact that slaveholders knew how to use community obligation
to control those around them, a like-minded southerner occupied the White
House in 1835 and he was not the kind of president who could let something
like the abolitionist mail crisis pass without getting personally involved.
Immediately after the first abolitionist mail bombing of the South, President
Andrew Jackson wrote to advise Amos Kendall on how the matter should be
handled. Following the code of “community obligation,” Jackson thought that
it was best to let southern neighbors pressure other southerners to reject the
publications.“We can do nothing more than direct that those inflamatory [sic]
papers be delivered to none but who will demand them as subscribers,” wrote
Jackson. “In every instance the Postmaster ought to take the names down, and
have them exposed thro the publik [sic] journals as subscribers to this wicked
plan of exciting the negroes to insurrection and to massacre.” Jackson’s
response was typical of other southerners—locals should take care of the
problem at home with unification, vigilance, and threats. Jackson believed that
with such publicity “every moral and good citizen will unite to put them in
coventry, and avoid their society. This, if adopted, would put their circulation
down everywhere, for there are few so hardened in villainy, as to withstand the
frowns of all good men.”42
Jackson had misread the situation. For, while slaveholder threats and vigi-
lance had already had a prohibitive effect on southern demands for abolition-
ist reading material, he seems to have overlooked the fact that southerners had
not actually subscribed to the newspapers. Rather, abolitionists sent newspa-
pers that few wanted to read, or to have anyone else read, for that matter. 43 It
was this willful intrusion into the southern public sphere that slaveholders
most objected to; the slavocracy simply did not want the question of abolition
to be publicly discussed. And while the mass of southerners understood that
this topic was off-limits, outsider abolitionists were using newspapers and the
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post office in an attempt to force the topic onto the southern public agenda.
Because the abolitionists had preyed on a loophole in the federal laws to infil-
trate the southern public sphere—“perverted” the law as Kendall had writ-
ten—slaveholders hoped that the federal government would protect their
interests by eliminating abolitionists’ access to the South through the postal
system.
Therefore, because the norms of community obligation could not reach
northern abolitionists who were in no way a part of the southern community,
Jackson made the issue a federal concern in his December 7, 1835, message to
Congress. His outrage at the mail bombing was evident when he described it
as “destructive of the harmony and peace of the country, and so repugnant to
the principles of our national compact, and to the dictates of humanity and
religion.”44 Like Congressman Jones of Virginia, President Jackson found the
country to be “fortunate” because of the professed anti-abolitionist sentiment
expressed by “the good sense, the generous feeling, and the deep-rooted
attachment of the people of the non-slaveholding States of the Union.” But,
like other slaveholders who had called for more action and less talk, Jackson
found this anti-abolitionist talk lacking.
But if these expressions of the public shall not be sufficient to effect so desirable
a result, not a doubt can be entertained that the non-slaveholding States, so far
from countenancing the slightest interference with the constitutional rights of
the South, will be prompt to exercise their authority in suppressing, so far as in
them lies, whatever is calculated to produce this evil.45
Just as other slaveholders had done, Jackson called upon the North to take
action to censor and to prohibit the association of abolitionists in order to
secure southern safety. He asked Congress to pass “such law as will prohibit,
under severe penalties, the circulation in the southern States, through the mail,
of incendiary publications intended to instigate the slaves to insurrection.”
Even though Jackson supported the use of local community law—both North
and South—to control the bad mail, like other southerners he hoped that the
federal government would assume its responsibility, its “great trust,” and close
abolitionists’ access to the southern public sphere. He argued that doing so
would “preserve inviolate the relations created among the States by the
Constitution.”46 Thus we see an exact replica of slaveholder outrage as printed
in local newspapers and in Committee of Safety Resolutions: abolitionists had
violated southern rights and safety and while the North may have feigned sup-
port for slaveholders, direct action was required to preserve the Constitution
and the Union. President Jackson clearly understood the mandates of com-
munity obligation.
HOW SLAVEHOLDERS RESPONDED TO THE ABOLITIONIST MAIL CRISIS OF 1835 67
However, Jackson urged that national legislation relieve the South of the
added burden of defending its public sphere and in so doing he unwittingly set
in motion events that would result in the ultimate, if nominal, supremacy of
outsider perspectives on this question. The House of Representatives and the
Senate both considered resolutions consistent with Jackson’s message. The
House sent the question to the Committee on Post Office and Post Roads,
which buried it, never to be debated by the Committee of the Whole. The
Senate, however, eventually debated a censorship bill, but did not pass it.
Rising in its place was a bill which “prohibited any postmaster, under severe
penalty, from unlawfully detaining in his office any letter, package, pamphlet,
or newspaper and refusing to deliver the same to the person to whom it was
addressed.” 47 Jackson refused to sign the bill into law for seven months, but
eventually acquiesced. Southern states refused to enforce the bill and it
remained a “dead letter law” until after the Civil War.
THE RHETORIC OF HONOR
The abolitionist mail crisis of 1835 illustrates how the pressure of community
obligation could be used to mitigate the dangerous threat of outside “poison”
from disrupting the carefully ordered system of control that was slaveholder
mastery. But, the rhetorical use of community obligation could only work on
those actually within the community. Appeals to outsiders were significantly
more violent and were couched in the language of war. 48 Robert L. Ivie has
carefully examined how appeals to victimage, vilification, and savagery in war
rhetoric allow for justifications of “reluctant belligerence” based on the logic
of “necessary evil.” 49 For example, Ivie has argued that a “just war” must be
presented as a “reluctant war”: “That is, a people strongly committed to the
ideal of peace, but simultaneously faced with the reality of war, must believe
that the fault for any such disruption of their ideal lies with others.” The scape-
goat-enemy is “portrayed as a savage i.e., as an aggressor, driven by irrational
desires for conquest, who is seeking to subjugate others by force of arms.”
Further, the enemy’s actions are portrayed as “coercive, irrational, and aggres-
sive attempts to subjugate a freedom-loving, rational, and pacific victim.” Ivie
believes that the categories of “force vs. freedom, irrationality vs. rationality,
and aggression vs. defense permeate the substance and style of the call-to-arms
throughout American history,” and therefore, by his logic we would expect to
find them in use in antebellum slaveholder rhetoric. 50
Indeed, slaveholders believed that “miserable fanatics,” who were hoping to
foment “insurrection,” had attacked the South; as such, slaveholders viewed
themselves as defending their freedom from the force of irrational aggressors.
One Charlestonian, for example, could not understand why non-slaveholding
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states were “designated the free states, thus plainly implying a taunt on the
slaveholding states.” He asked his fellow southerners if they would “remain
passive under these insults and not notice them in the way of rebuke and of
retort if necessary?”51 Clearly, his answer was no, the South should not remain
passive and allow northerners to portray southerners as less free. He was not
alone. Published and republished throughout the country, Amos Kendall’s
demand for community loyalty—“we owe an obligation to the laws, but a
higher one to the community in which we live”—represented the tenor of the
slaveholder response to abolitionist aggression: unify southern communities,
threaten abolitionist outsiders, and vigilantly maintain southern order. In
short, slaveholders in 1835 believed that they were fighting a just war, which
helps us to comprehend the violent response to the abolitionists’ newspapers
within their midst.
Even though slaveholders cast their war against abolitionists as “just,” they
did not portray themselves as “reluctant” belligerents. Slaveholders were not
“unwilling victims” of abolitionist aggression, but were, as they repeatedly
declared, fearless warriors fighting in defense of their right to control their
public sphere. What could explain this radical departure from the common
strategy of positioning oneself as the victim? Certainly slaveholders portrayed
abolitionists as the traditional scapegoat in their attempts to unify southern-
ers to vigilantly protect their public sphere, so why would they radically
diverge from the rhetoric of victimage? The answer to this conundrum may lie
in the “culture of honor” prevalent among the antebellum southern gentry.
As Joanne B. Freeman argued in Affairs of Honor, the “code of honor” was
neither unique to the South nor was it invented in America.52 On the contrary,
as the work of anthropologists John G. Peristiany and Julian Pitt-Rivers
demonstrates, honor and grace have long functioned as societal regulators.53
Yet, according to Bertram Wyatt-Brown, while the culture of honor had long
defined acceptable relations among men in the antebellum South it was both
more important and more violent: “the darker, more unpleasant aspects of
Southern life betokened the continuation of the archaic forms, kept alive by
the exigencies of an inhospitable, dangerous world where masters had to rule
in fear.” Southern honor was “an encoded system, a matter of interchanges
between the individual and the community to which he or she belonged.
Meaning was imparted not with words, but in courtesies, rituals, and even
deeds of personal and collective violence.”54
Honor must be understood in relation to its counterpart: shame. “An
individual,” according to Wyatt-Brown, “was expected to have a healthy
sense of shame, that is, a sense of his own honor. Shamelessness signified a
disregard for both honor and disgrace.”55 Therefore, when Amos Kendall
asserted the primacy of community obligation and Andrew Jackson believed
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that the abolitionist mail crisis could easily be resolved by shaming the recip-
ients of the propaganda—“there are few so hardened in villainy, as to with-
stand the frowns of all good men,” he had said—they demonstrated the
prevalence of the culture of honor in southern responses to the abolitionists’
mail. The norms of community obligation—the transactional relationship
of honor and shame between a citizen and his or her community—and the
power of public shame should have prevented all but the most “hardened in
villainy” from receiving the newspapers. Jackson’s simple solution for resolv-
ing the mail crisis was to expose recipients of the papers to public shame, but
while this solution addressed the problem of freely circulating abolitionist
propaganda, it did nothing to resolve the larger problem that slaveholders
faced: reasserting control.
As outsiders, abolitionists had attempted to impose shame on slaveholders
and in so doing had threatened elite control. This point is crucial for under-
standing the violent slaveholder response because, as Wyatt-Brown notes,
southerners negotiated the culture of honor with three related judgments:
first, “the evaluation of the public”; second, “self-assessment before the pub-
lic”; and finally, “a judgment based on the behavior of the claimant.” In other
words, a person’s, a family’s, or a community’s good reputation was the basis
of acceptance, status, and privilege in the South. Therefore, a good reputation
was worth fighting for; the number of “affairs of honor” in the southern states
attests to the fact that southerners took the code seriously enough to risk
death. 56 As southern leaders were well aware, the South as a whole had been
shamed by abolitionists who asserted that slavery was debased. By mailing the
pamphlets into the South, abolitionists impugned the honor of the South and
held it up as a land of shameless libertines who were disrespectful of the
morals of humanity. Therefore, perhaps the most important feature of the
code of southern honor was the relationship between community sanction
and honor because, quite simply, “when shame was imposed by others, honor
was stripped away.”57
In response to public shaming, southerners knew that they must fight in
order to regain their honor and retain their status. A fight for honor need not,
indeed could not, be justified through a rhetoric of victimage; a fight for
honor could only be presented as an indignant, willing defense of reputation
and status. The claims of the enemy would have to be minimized and trivial-
ized, even as the enemy was used as a scapegoat to unify community opinion
in support of the dishonored party’s reputation. Abolitionists were “miserable
fanatics,” or contemptible and irrational enthusiasts. Miserable fanatics could
only be destroyed in defense of honor, not persuaded or dismissed. The slav-
ocracy had no doubt that the South benefited from their leadership and from
slavery, so there was no threat that the abolitionists’ newspapers would cause
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slaveholders to believe that they had been legitimately shamed. But, because
honor was so tied to reputation and community, slaveholders still had to per-
form a defense of their honor and its attendant privileges in order to retain
power and control.58 Hence, the violent reaction of the South—the willing
belligerence—was a defense of personal and regional honor in the face of an
outsider shaming. The slaveholders’ successful use of the rhetoric of honor not
only allowed them to reassert control over their local communities, but
because it was so successful in unifying southern opinion and behavior, it also
allowed them to reassert control over national abolition debates and poli-
cies—no small feat, to be sure.
The main features of the rhetoric of honor can be extrapolated from the
story of the slaveholder response to the abolitionist mail campaign of 1835.
First, persuasion is directed inward to local community members who are
asked to unite and to vigilantly and violently defend community norms. As
Celeste Condit’s work would suggest, the rhetoric of honor is not devoted to
“rational explanation,” but to “rituals reconfirming shared values”; in other
words, it is epideictic rather than deliberative.59 The second, and closely
related, feature of the rhetoric of honor is that it is designed to silence enemies.
Abolitionists were enemies and enemies were outsiders who were beyond the
reach of community norms, obligation, or consensus. Persuasion was reserved
for community insiders who could reaffirm the honor of the accused and,
thus, enemies could only be engaged with violence, not words. The third, and
final, feature of the rhetoric of honor is that it is meant to restore reputation
and status above all else—it is epideictic violence: discourse that uses the man-
dates of community obligation to punish outsiders and control insiders.
The parallels between the rhetoric of honor as epideictic violence and the
actual violence of the code duello are obvious: if shamed, then honor can only
be restored by demanding satisfaction. Slaveholders knew that to restore their
honor abolitionists would have had either to admit their own guilt, fight, or
run away. Slaveholders initially insisted that abolitionists admit their own guilt
and stop the mailing. When this strategy failed, they demanded that the North
actively defend southern honor. When this last strategy failed, slaveholders
ordered violent retribution. In each of these steps slaveholders insisted,
demanded, and ordered abolitionists and northerners; they always assumed
the position of indignant superior, never did they position themselves as sup-
plicant or peer. In short, they demanded that the affront to their honor be rec-
tified on their own terms, thus reaffirming their local reputation and status in
tone, style, and violence.
Slaveholders’ expert use of the norms of community obligation, supported
by the rhetoric of honor, allowed them both to reassert control over the abo-
lition debate and to retain their status and privilege. But what can be said of
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the ethical implications of the rhetoric of honor? When only friends can be
persuaded and enemies must be silenced, then there is no potential for real
democracy. When a difference of opinion is deemed “incendiary,” then there
can be no debate, no freedom of speech, and no opportunity for deliberation.
When the culture of honor trumps democracy and epideictic violence is the
only acceptable form of speech, then authoritarian regimes prevail. The
rhetoric of honor certainly is not limited to slaveholder defenses of slavery;
rather it has, and does still, permeate the American political community.
Certainly the rhetoric of honor does not always lead to repressive forms of
speech. But, because oppression is always a possibility, scholars and citizens
should closely examine how the rhetorical embodiment of the culture of
honor functions in American public discourse.
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